Monday, July 7, 2008
Saturday, May 24, 2008
Olduvai Revisited
Olduvai revisited 2008
Posted by Luis de Sousa on
Luis.A.de.Sousa@gmail.com
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2656287165913612688&hl=en video
My first post at TOD was published by Heading Out about 2 years ago on this same subject. Some rather naïve forecasts were made back then, without exactly addressing the main subject: can Mankind avoid the Road to the
The work on this article started in the Spring of 2007, when Euan Mearns tried to show that Peak Oil does not necessarily imply an Energy crunch. Partly due to my critique, Euan's work would never see the light of day. Sometime later, Euan and I started working together on the work reported here, focusing on Conventional Fossil Fuels (FF). The fact that several studies on future Coal reserves and extraction rates were published in the interim, facilitated our work.
This work would end up being a collective post by TOD:E, Rembrandt kindly provided historical FF data and Chris Vernon would solve some issues with the conversion of primary energy to heat. An important leap towards the conclusion of this work was made during the weekend of the 1st of December, when the TOD:E staff gathered in
Introduction
The Olduvai Gorge Theory was first laid out by Richard Duncan in 1989, when he observed that world energy per capita had been declining for a decade. He developed the concept of Electrical Civilization, the way of life made possible by widespread and abundant electricity and set it to the period in which world energy per capita is above 30% of its all-time peak. The Theory was postulated it in the following way:
- Industrial Civilization can be described by a single pulse waveform of duration X, as measured by average energy-use per person per year.
- The life-expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than one-hundred (100) years: i.e., X <>
Figure 1 - The three phases of the Olduvai Decline. Source:
The post-peak period develops in three phases:
The Olduvai Slope – a period of slow decline;
The Olduvai Slide – a period triggered by Peak Oil when decline would accelerate;
The Olduvai Cliff – the collapse of Electrical Civilization with overwhelming decline of energy per capita.
This seminal work would result in
As the years went by it became clear that world energy per capita was in a plateau, not a decline, and in 2005 the 1979 peak was surpassed. Still, almost ninety percent of the total energy used world wide comes from fossil fuels. If such dependence on finite resources remains, the Olduvai Theory may eventually unfold.
Figure 2 - World Primary Energy Per Capita. Population from
This work tries to assess how the decline of Conventional Fossil Fuels may unfold and how can Mankind avoid the Road that may take us back to the Olduvai Gorge.
The Future of Conventional Fossil Fuels
In the context of this work, Conventional Fossil Fuels represents the kinds of these resources in production today. These may include fuels usually called Unconventional like the Tar Sands or Coal Bed Methane. It is assumed that none of the Unconventional Fuels Fossil will have a visible impact on the overall world energy production for two main reasons: the volumes produced are unlikely to be significant (e.g. Tar Sands) and the net energy balance of some is doubtfully positive (e.g. Ultra-deep Offshore). The one exception is Coal where in-situ gasification might turn important Resources into Reserves (this issue will be dealt with later).
Our approach has been to use what we regard as the best researched and most reliable estimates for future global oil natural gas and coal production. Each fuel is re-based in "oil equivalent". And we use the UN population forecasts to derive a per capita FF forecast. However, the main objective of this work is to develop scenarios for alternative energies (nuclear and renewables) that may partially fill the energy gap left by declining FF. These scenarios are not forecasts but have been produced to illustrate the scale of the energy problem that now confronts Mankind.
Oil
For Oil, the forecast made by Khebab using a Loglets Transform, was chosen. This scenario is in line with those of several other researchers: Jean Lahèrrere, Colin Campbell, Chris Skebrowski and Kenneth Deffeyes. Laid down this way, Oil Production peaks by 2012.
Figure 3 - Conventional Oil Forecast (including NGL) according to the
Natural Gas
The scenario chosen for Natural Gas is that produced by Jean Laherrère portraying a peak by 2030. This scenario can be considered optimistic to some extent, but takes into account the high degree of uncertainty on Natural Gas forecasting, among other reasons, due to poor data on past discovery and production. This forecast also includes Coal Bed Methane and other Unconventional gas sources.
Figure 4 - Natural Gas Forecast (including Unconventional). Source:
Coal
Coal has been regarded as an infinite resource on a generation time scale, but recent assessments imply otherwise. The following graph shows three independent forecasts, by Jean Laherrère, the Energy Watch Group and David Rutledge, all peaking before mid-century. Of these the one made by the Energy Watch Group was chosen, for being at the midst of the three and for the thoroughness involved in its production. This scenario presents a plateau roughly from 2020 to 2040.
Figure 5 - Conventional Coal Forecasts. Sources: Jean Laherrère [pdf!], Energy Watch Group and David Rutledge. Click for large version.
Fossil Fuel Olduvai
When added together these three forecasts present an overall Conventional Fossil Fuels peak by 2018, forming a single cycle which by itself is a notable result. If for instance a higher Coal estimate is used, the peak hardly moves and the only visible effect is a slowdown of the decline.
Figure 6 - Together the Conventional Fossil Fuels are set to peak before 2020 describing a single cycle.
Sources: Jean Laherrère [pdf!] for Natural Gas, Energy Watch Group for Coal and The Oil Drum for Oil. Click for large version.
A population model was developed using United Nations data, to which a single logistic cycle was adjusted. World Population tops 7 billion just after 2010, reaches 8 billion before 2030, 9 billion by 2050 and stabilizes after that to end up in 9.8 billion by the end of the century.
Figure 7 - Population growth model using a single logistic cycle.
Base data source: UN. Click for large version.
The outcome of these models is a Fossil Fuel per capita peak by 2012 in tandem with Peak Oil, although it is maintained above 10 barrels of oil equivalent from now up to 2020. By 2050 that number is below 6 barrels of oil equivalent per capita declining to just above 1 by the end of the century. Led by the Conventional Fossil Fuels, the Olduvai Pulse is interpreted to be much longer than anticipated by
Figure 8 - Forecast for Conventional Fossil Fuels per Capita.
Sources: UN for Population model, Jean Laherrère [pdf!] for Natural Gas, Energy Watch Group for Coal and The Oil Drum for Oil. Click for large version.
The total useful energy drawn from Conventional Fossil Fuels equates today to more than 300 Twh every day, or the equivalent to 4250 Nuclear power plants working non-stop.
The Scenarios
Henceforth this article tries to assess what actions are required for the current standards of living to be sustained throughout the XXI century. Using again the United Nations population forecast the build up of alternative energy infrastructure is determined in order to compensate for the decline of Conventional Fossil Fuels.
Four different scenarios are presented: two in which several alternative energy sources are used to cover the gap left by the Fossil Fuels. And two others where world energy use undergoes a significant efficiency improvement enabling living standards to be maintained on a much lower per capita energy consumption. A fifth scenario, where world population declines significantly is not presented here.
The alternative energy sources considered are the following:
Nuclear - assuming that no shortages of nuclear fuel may unfold or that new technologies like breeder reactors or accelerator driven systems are timely developed. Nuclear went from friend to foe during the XX century to emerge again as an alternative with the end of cheap Oil. Concerns with the fuel supply have been present since the 1970s, to which Thorium and breeder systems promise to put an end, perhaps one or two decades from now. Problems could remain with waste disposal, due to negative public opinion, and weapons production. Accelerator driven systems and fusion rectors could in their turn solve these last problems, but if successful are several decades away.
The basic infrastructure unit used corresponds to a 1 Gw plant operating at full capacity.
Unconventional Coal - assuming the development of technologies needed to access deeper seams, offshore or other constrained resources. Great uncertainty surrounds the future of Coal Resources not extractable today. Technologies like in-situ gasification can potentially access seams presently inaccessible while at the same time addressing concerns with CO2 emissions; but a proof of concept is yet to be achieved. Unconventional Coal is also a non-renewable resource that may not look like the best alternative to build a sustainable future upon, although it can eventually provide an important launch pad for it.
The basic infrastructure unit used corresponds to a 600 Mw plant operating at full capacity.
Wind energy - both on its onshore and offshore forms. A renewable energy source with a proven track record, is now technologically where Nuclear was in the 1960s. In
The infrastructure units correspond to 3 Mw turbines operating at 30% load for Onshore Wind and to 5 Mw turbines at 40% load for Offshore.
Solar - the dormant giant? At an earlier stage of market penetration compared to Wind, it will certainly undergo the same kind of growth. Due to the simplicity of passive systems and the falling costs of photovoltaics, a Solar revolution could be on the making. Especially in the warmer countries of the Temperate Regions this will likely be a major energy source in the XXI century.
The basic infrastructure unit reflects the average insulation at 40º latitude per Km2 captured with an efficiency of 15%.
These alternative energy sources were compared to the Fossil Fuels on the grounds of the electricity they produce. To generate useful energy, Fossil Fuels generally undergo a process in which they are transformed into heat that is then captured as motion, electricity, etc. With some of the alternative energy sources a similar process takes place (e.g. a Nuclear reactor that heats water into steam that turns a turbine generating electricity).
Figure 9 - Simple schematics of a Carnot heat engine.
Primary Energy refers to Qin, Useful Energy to work done (W). The engine's efficiency is given by W/Qin.
Click to know more.
Given that for most of the alternatives the nameplate generation capacity refers to electricity output, the numbers shown henceforth refer to this stage of energy generation. For the primary energy to heat transformation an efficiency of one third was used. This is a postulated round number that seems representative enough; a combined cycle Natural Gas power plant probably achieves a higher efficiency, while for a Daimler internal combustion engine it will likely be lower. As an example, using this efficiency number, a 1 Gw Nuclear power plant operating during an hour replaces 3 Gwh of primary energy from the Fossil Fuels (approximately 1800 boe).
Before moving on two important implicit assumptions of these scenarios should be made explicit:
Net Energy – it is assumed that the overall Energy Return on Investment of these alternatives is exactly the same of the overall Conventional Fossil Fuels. That is hardly the case, but the difficulty in assessing Net Energy accurately impedes a sound analysis on this ground. Especially in the case of Coal, that likely has a return on investment much higher that the other sources, this issue could be determinant. Future work will have to address this problem.
Energy Vectors – it is assumed that all energy vectors are substituted by electricity (the only exception being passive solar use: cooking, water heating, etc). The reasons why will be explained in future work, but it implies the build up of additional infrastructure that is not present in the numbers shown below.
The following curves will show the number of new plants or equipments needed each year to cover the lag left by the fossil fuel decline.
Scenario I – A single energy source.
In this first scenario it is shown how each of these energy sources can tackle the energy gap left by declining FF on its own. In this case, new infrastructure must be deployed starting in 2018 rising fast to a peak deployment rate before 2040 and then slowly easing down. At peak, more than 4 500 Thw must be generated from new infrastructure. By the end of the century this sums up to a 140 000 Twh of energy generated per year from alternative energy sources.
| |
| Nuclear | Coal | Offshore Wind | Onshore Wind | Solar | Energy |
| |
| Figure 10 - Infrastructure build up for |
Table 1 - Scenario I in numbers.
| Scenario I | New infrastructure per year at peak | Total infrastructure in 2100 |
| Nuclear | 90 | 5 400 |
| Coal | 155 | 9 000 |
| Offshore Wind | 46 000 | 2 700 000 |
| Onshore Wind | 100 000 | 6 000 000 |
| Solar (Km2) | 3 000 | 190 000 |
Scenario II – Three simultaneous energy sources.
The second scenario considers the case where three of these alternative energy sources are deployed simultaneously to fill the energy gap. This results in the previous numbers being divided by three, with the following curves assuming that two other alternative energy sources are being stepped up simultaneously. Peak is now at 1 500 Twh generated per year from each additional source, reaching more than 45 000 Twh generated per source per year by the end of the century.
| |
| Nuclear | Coal | Offshore Wind | Onshore Wind | Solar | Energy |
| |
| Figure 11 - Infrastructure build up curves for Scenario II. |
Table 2 - Scenario II in numbers.
| Scenario II | New infrastructure per year at peak | Total infrastructure in 2100 |
| Nuclear | 30 | 1 800 |
| Coal | 50 | 3 000 |
| Offshore Wind | 15 000 | 900 000 |
| Onshore Wind | 35 000 | 2 000 000 |
| Solar (Km2) | 1 000 | 60 000 |
The Efficiency Wedge
For the remaining scenarios a world wide improvement in energy efficiency is factored in. Presently the world's consumption of fossil fuels is close to 70 Gboe (just over 10 boe/cap/a), while the global GDP is just under 70 T$. This results in less than 1 000 dollars generated for each barrel of oil equivalent consumed. The following graph shows the relation between fossil fuel use and GDP per capita in several countries, both developed and developing nations, excluding the
Figure 12 - GDP generated per barrel of oil equivalent consumed of Fossil Fuels. GDP from Wikipedia, Energy from BP.
World average GDP per capita was calculated with data from more than 180 countries resulting in 10 000 dollars per year. Using the trend in Figure 12 it becomes apparent that such average wealth standards should be sustained with just 5 barrels of oil equivalent per capita per year. This results in an efficiency of 2 000 dollars produced per barrel of oil equivalent, a number that is used as the target for global energy use efficiency.
The trend also shows that higher income countries are those that tend to have lower energy efficiency. So being, a global increase in energy efficiency use would be achieved mostly at the expense of developed nations. Some highly populated developing nations with lower energy use efficiency would likely also need some improvements.
No assumptions are made concerning wealth distribution, it is just set that, on average, each barrel of oil equivalent generates 2 000 dollars of GDP worldwide. Such is already the case in several countries, both developed and developing nations, as seen in the following table:
Table 3 - GDP generated per boe of Fossil Fuel consumed in several countries.
| Country | GDP(US$)/boe(FF) |
| | 3 348 |
| | 2 897 |
| | 2 698 |
| | 2 673 |
| | 2 599 |
| | 2 451 |
| | 2 326 |
| | 2 312 |
| | 2 210 |
| | 2 207 |
| | 2 204 |
| | 2 097 |
| | 2 089 |
| | 2 051 |
| | 2 028 |
| Brasil | 2 018 |
| | 1 887 |
| | 1 730 |
| | 1 274 |
| | 1 052 |
| | 462 |
Reflecting this relation a model was thus developed in which the fraction of today's annual energy (derived from the fossil fuels) use per capita slowly declines throughout the XXI century to 5 barrels of oil equivalent (approximately 2.8 Mwh of useful energy).
Figure 13 - The Efficiency Wedge model: primary energy needs per capita fall to 5 boe/a (8.5 Mwh/a) through the XXI century.
In light of this model the previous scenarios are revisited. The build up curves are markedly different, showing two distinct phases of growth. At first the alternative energy sources must grow rapidly to fill the gap, but as the efficiency wedge factors in, the build up almost stalls by mid century. Then, as the conventional fossil fuels reach their final days the build up has to slowly increase again.
Figure 14 - With the Efficiency Wedge the build up curves start latter and exhibit two distinct phases of growth.
Scenario III – A single energy source with efficiency wedge.
Scenario III illustrates the amount of new infrastructure required for each of the alternatives assuming that the energy efficiency wedge reduces our consumption by half towards the end of the XXI century . Infrastructure build up now peaks just under 1 500 Twh additionally generated per year, summing 60 000 Twh of energy generated per year by 2100.
| |
| Nuclear | Coal | Offshore Wind | Onshore Wind | Solar | Energy |
| |
| Figure 15 - Infrastructure build up curves for Scenario III. |
Table 4 - Scenario III in numbers.
| Scenario III | New infrastructure per year at peak | Total infrastructure in 2100 |
| Nuclear | 55 | 2 200 |
| Coal | 90 | 3 700 |
| Offshore Wind | 28 000 | 1 100 000 |
| Onshore Wind | 62 000 | 2 500 000 |
| Solar (Km2) | 2 000 | 75 000 |
Scenario IV – Three simultaneous energy sources with efficiency wedge.
The last scenario looks at three alternatives simultaneously tackling the energy gap with the efficiency wedge reducing consumption. Infrastructure build up now peaks with 500 Twh additionally generated per year, summing 20 000 Twh generated per year by century's end.
| |
| Nuclear | Coal | Offshore Wind | Onshore Wind | Solar | Energy |
| |
| Figure 16 - Infrastructure build up curves for Scenario IV. |
Table 5 - Scenario IV in numbers.
| Scenario IV | New infrastructure per year at peak | Total infrastructure in 2100 |
| Nuclear | 19 | 740 |
| Coal | 30 | 1 200 |
| Offshore Wind | 9 300 | 370 000 |
| Onshore Wind | 21 000 | 820 000 |
| Solar (Km2) | 640 | 25 000 |
Conclusion
According to our analysis, conventional fossil fuels are set to peak in a decade or so and following that, decline will open an ever widening gap from today's per capita energy use. Based on finite FF resources, energy per capita is indeed headed towards a cliff, and this may lead Mankind back to the
The analysis presented here suggests that it is within the capacity of human endeavor to build new energy gathering infrastructure to substitute for the decline in conventional fossil fuels. By combining energy efficiency measures with the simultaneous expansion of solar, wind and nuclear energy Mankind may secure a civilised existence for the XXI century. A tremendous opportunity exists to build a more sustainable energy future and building this future will provide vast opportunity for economic growth and prosperity.
Figure 17 - Useful Energy from the Fossil Fuels.
The solid areas reflect the useful energy got from the Fossil Fuels according to the data and models used. The dashed lines reflect the total energy needed to maintain current standards of energy use per capita, with the orange line also factoring in the efficiency wedge model.
Click for large version.
The next two to three decades are crucial, where the fastest build of alternative infrastructure is needed, and when the efficiency wedge will have the slowest effect. But the numbers contemplated here are not insurmountable, and should be tackled with the right commitment and timely action.
To all the humans facing the Road to the
Luís de Sousa
Euan Mearns
TheOilDrum:
Annex
Following is a spreadsheet with the data and calculations involved in the making of this article:
Open Document version:
http://www.theoildrum.com/files/Olduvai2008.ods [240Kb]
Microsoft version:
http://www.theoildrum.com/files/Olduvai2008.xls [660Kb]
Peak Oil Production
The Peak of World Olduvai Gorge
Richard C. Duncan, Ph.D.
Pardee Keynote Symposia
Geological Society of
Summit 2000
The theory is a proposed way of measuring industrial civilisation by a single ratio - world annual energy use to population. The important idea is that, unlike previous civilisations which have risen and fallen to be replaced by others, industrial civilisation would be the last because we would have used up all the easily obtainable resources (oil, coal, minerals) which are necessary for a civilisation to form.
The theory is defined by the ratio of world energy production (use) and world population. The details are worked out. The theory is easy. It states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilisation is less than or equal to 100 years: 1930–2030.
World energy production per capita from 1945 to 1973 grew at a breakneck speed of 3.45%/year. Next from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979, it slowed to a sluggish 0.64%/year. Then suddenly – and for the first time in history - energy production per capita took a long-term decline of 0.33%/year from 1979 to 1999. The Olduvai theory explains the 1979 peak and the subsequent decline. More to the point, it says that energy production per capita will fall to its 1930 value by 2030, thus giving Industrial Civilisation a lifetime of less than or equal to 100 years.
Abstract
The Olduvai theory has been called unthinkable, preposterous, absurd, dangerous, self-fulfilling, and self-defeating. I offer it, however, as an inductive theory based on world energy and population data and on what I’ve seen during the past 30 years in some 50 nations on all continents except
The theory is defined by the ratio of world energy production (use) and world population. The details are worked out. The theory is easy. It states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to 100 years: 1930-2030.
World energy production per capita from 1945 to 1973 grew at a breakneck speed of 3.45%/year. Next from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979, it slowed to a sluggish 0.64%/year. Then suddenly —and for the first time in history — energy production per capita took a long-term decline of 0.33%/year from 1979 to 1999. The Olduvai theory explains the 1979 peak and the subsequent decline. More to the point, it says that energy production per capita will fall to its 1930 value by 2030, thus giving Industrial Civilization a lifetime of less than or equal to 100 years.
Should this occur, any number of factors could be cited as the 'causes' of collapse. I believe, however, that the collapse will be strongly correlated with an 'epidemic' of permanent blackouts of high-voltage electric power networks — worldwide. Briefly explained: "When the electricity goes out, you are back in the Dark Age. And the Stone Age is just around the corner."
The Olduvai theory, of course, may be proved wrong. But, as of now, it cannot be rejected by the historic world energy production and population data.
Institute on Energy and Man
The Peak of World Olduvai Gorge
Richard C. Duncan, Ph.D.
Pardee Keynote Symposia
Geological Society of
Summit 2000
Collapse, if and when it comes again, will this time be global. No longer can any individual nation collapse. World civilization will disintegrate as a whole. Competitors who evolve as peers collapse in like manner. Joseph A. Tainter, 1988
1. Introduction
The Olduvai theory is a data-based schema that states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal 100 years. We shall develop the theory from its early roots in Greek philosophy down to respected scientists in the 20th century. This approach is useful because, although the theory is easy to understand, it is difficult (i.e. distressing) for most people to accept - just as it was for me.
The Olduvai theory deals neither with the geology or the paleontology of the
No doubt that the peak and decline of Industrial Civilization, should it occur, will be due to a complex matrix of causes, such as overpopulation, the depletion of nonrenewable resources, environmental damage, pollution, soil erosion, global warming, newly emerging viruses, and resource wars. That said, the Olduvai theory uses a single metric only, as defined by "White's Law." But now it comes with a new twist - (((a will-o'-the-wisp))) - electricity.
Most of my industrial experience is in electric power networks and the energy management systems (
This paper is the backup for the accompanying slide show titled "The Olduvai Theory: An Illustrated Guide" (see
Definitions: "Oil" (O) means crude oil and natural gas liquids. 'Energy' (E) means the primary sources of energy - specifically oil, gas, coal, and nuclear & hydropower. 'Pop' means world population. 'ô' means oil production per capita. 'ê' means energy production per capita. "G" means billion (10^9). "b" means barrels of oil. 'boe' means barrels of oil equivalent (energy content, not quality). 'J' means joule. 'Industrial Civilization' and 'Electrical Civilization', as we shall see, mean the same thing.
Industrial Civilization is shown as a pulse-shaped curve of world average energy-use per capita (ê). The 'life expectancy' (i.e. 'duration') of Industrial Civilization is defined as the time (in years) between the upside point when ê reaches 30% of its peak value and the corresponding downside point when ê falls to the same value (Figure 4). The new twist is that the Olduvai theory now focuses on the mounting problems with the high-voltage electric power networks - worldwide.
Civilization and Ready Kilowatt: Although the fossil fuels are still very important, electricity is the indispensable end-use energy for Industrial Civilization. To determine its importance, it is essential to distinguish between the primary energy consumed to generate electricity versus the primary energy consumed for all other (i.e. non-electric) end-uses, such as work and heat. Consider the following. We estimate that 42% of the world's primary energy in 1999 was consumed to generate electricity. This compares to oil's contribution to all non-electric end-uses of 39%; gas' contribution of 18%; and coal's contribution of a mere 1%. Moreover: When energy quality is accounted for, then the importance of electricity becomes very, VERY clear. For example, if you want to heat your room, then 1 joule (J) of coal is 'equal' to 1 J of electricity. However, if you want to power up your TV, then 1 J of electricity is 'equal' to 3 J of coal! So if you're going to worry about energy, then don't loose sleep over oil, gas, and coal. Worry about the electric switch on the wall!
2. Energy And Civilization
Other factors remaining constant, culture evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the instrumental means of putting the energy to work is increased. We may now sketch the history of cultural development from this standpoint. Leslie White, 1949 "White's Law"
Oil is liquid, power packed, and portable. It is the major primary source of energy for Industrial Civilization. (But not the major end-use source!) We have developed a new method of modeling and simulation and then used it to make a series of five forecasts of world oil production - one new forecast every year. Figure 1 shows the main results of our most recent forecast, i.e. Forecast #5. (
Figure 1. World, OPEC, and Non-OPEC Oil Production
Notes: (1) World oil production is forecast to peak in 2006. (2) The OPEC/non-OPEC crossover event occurs in 2008. (3) The OPEC nations' rate of oil production from 1985 to 1999 increased by 9.33 times that of the non-OPEC nations.
Figure 1 shows the historic world oil production data from 1960 to 1999 and our forecasts from 2000 to 2040. Note that the overall growth rate of oil production slowed from 1960 to 1999 (curve 1). In detail: The average rate of growth from 1960 to 1973 was a whopping 6.65%/year. Next, from 1973 to 1979 growth slowed to 1.49%/year. Then, from 1979 to 1999, it slowed yet further to a glacial 0.75%/year. Moving beyond the historic period, Forecast #5 predicts that world oil production will reach its all-time peak in 2006. Then from its peak in 2006 to year 2040 world oil production will fall by 58.8 % - an average decline of 2.45%/year during these 34 years.
The OPEC/non-OPEC crossover event is predicted to occur in 2008 (Figure 1, curves 2 &3). This event will divide the world into two camps: one with surplus oil, the other with none. Forecast #5 presents the following scenario. (1) Beginning in 2008 the 11 OPEC nations will produce more than 50% of the world's oil. (2) Thereafter OPEC will control nearly 100% of the world"s oil exports. (3) BP Amoco (2000) puts OPEC's "proved reserves" at 77.6% of the world total. (4) OPEC production from 1985 to 1999 grew at a strong average rate of 3.46%/year. In contrast, non-OPEC production grew at sluggish 0.37%/year during this same 14-year period.
The oil forecasting models, the application program to run them, and a User's Guide are all available free at www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/. (
The peak of world oil production (2006) and the OPEC/non-OPEC crossover event (2008) are important to the 'Olduvai schema', discussed later. But first let's have a look at the ratio of world oil production and world population. Figure 2 shows the historic data.
Figure 2. World Average Oil Production per Capita: 1920-1999
Notes: (1) World average oil production per capita (ô) grew exponentially from 1920 to 1973. (2) Next, the average growth rate was near zero from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979. (3) Then from its peak in 1979 to 1999, ô decreased strongly by an average of 1.20%/year. (4) Typical response: "I didn't know that!" (5) The little cartoons emphasize that oil is by far the major primary source of energy for transportation (i.e. about 95% of the oil produced in 1999 was used for transportation).
Figure 2 shows the world average oil production per capita from 1920 to 1999. The curve represents the ratio of world oil production (O) and world population (Pop): i.e. ô = O/(Pop) in barrels per capita per year (i.e. b/c/year). Note well that ô grew exponentially from 1920 to 1973. Next, growth was negligible from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979. Finally, from its peak in 1979 to 1999, ô decreased at an average rate of 1.20%/year (i.e. from 5.50 b/c in 1979 to 4.32 b/c in 1999). "You've gotta be kidding!"
The 1979 peak and decline of world oil production per capita are shown on page 11 of BP Amoco (2000), www.bpamoco.com/worldenergy/. Not to be missed.
Bottom Line: Although world oil production (O) from 1979 to 1999 increased at an average rate of 0.75%/year (Figure 1), world population (Pop) grew even faster. Thus world oil production per capita (ô) declined at an average rate of 1.20%/year during the 20 years from 1979 to 1999 (Figure 2).
The main goals in this study, as was mentioned, are to describe, discuss, and test the Olduvai theory of Industrial Civilization against historic data. Applying White's Law, our metric (i.e. indicator) is the ratio of world total energy production (E) and world population (Pop): i.e. ê = E/(Pop). Figure 3 shows ê during the historic period.
Figure 3. World Energy Production per Capita: 1920-1999
Notes: (1) World average energy production per capita (ê) grew significantly from 1920 to its all-time peak in 1979. (2) Then from its peak in 1979 to 1999, ê declined at an average rate of 0.33%/year. This downward trend is the "Olduvai slope", discussed later. (3) The tiny cartoons emphasize that the delivery of electricity to end-users is the sin quo non of the 'modern way of life'. Not hydrocarbons.
Observe the variability of ê in Figure 3. In detail: From 1920 to 1945 ê grew moderately at an average of 0.69%/year. Then from 1945 to 1973 it grew at the torrid pace of 3.45%/year. Next, from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979, growth slowed to 0.64%/year. But then suddenly - and for the first time in history - ê began a long-term decline extending from 1979 to 1999. This 20-year period is named the "Olduvai slope," the first of the three downside intervals in the "Olduvai schema."
Bottom Line: Although world energy production (E) from 1979 to 1999 increased at an average rate of 1.34%/year, world population (Pop) grew even faster. Thus world energy production per capita (ê) declined at an average rate of 0.33%/year during these same 20 years (Figure 3). See White's Law, top of this section.
Acknowledgments: As far as I know, credit goes to Robert Romer (1985) for being first to publish the peak-period data for world energy production per capita (ê) from 1900 to 1983. He put the peak (correctly!) in 1979, followed by a sharp decline through 1983, the last year of his data. Credit is also due to John Gibbons, et al. (1989) for publishing a graph of ê from 1950 to 1985. Gibbons, et al. put the peak in 1973. But curiously, neither of the above studies made any mention whatever about the importance of the peak and decline of world energy production per capita.
The 1979 peak and decline of world energy production per capita (ê) is shown on page 40 of BP Amoco (2000), www.bpamoco.com/worldenergy/. Have a look.
3. Evolution of an Idea
And what a glorious society we would have if men and women would regulate their affairs, as do the millions of cells in the developing embryo. Hans Spemann, 1938
The seeds of the Olduvai Theory were planted long ago. For example, the Greek lyric poet Pindar (c. 522-438 BCE) wrote, "What course after nightfall? Has destiny written that we must run to the end?" (Eiseley, 1970)
Arabic scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) regarded "group solidarity" as the primary requisite for civilization. "Civilization needs the tribal values to survive, but these very same values are destroyed by civilization. Specifically, urban civilization destroys tribal values with the luxuries that weaken kinship and community ties and with the artificial wants for new types of cuisine, new fashions in clothing, larger homes, and other novelties of urban life." (Weatherford, 1994)
Joseph Granvill in 1665 observed that, although energy-using machines made life easier, they also made it more dependent. "For example, if artificial demands are stimulated, than resources must be consumed at an ever-increasing pace." (Eiseley, 1970)
But, as far as I know, it was the American adventurer and writer Washington Irving (1783-1859) who was first to realize that civilization could quickly collapse.
Nations are fast losing their nationality. The great and increasing intercourse, the exchange of fashions and uniformity of opinions by the diffusion of literature are fast destroying those peculiarities that formerly prevailed. We shall in time grow to be very much one people, unless a return to barbarism throws us again into chaos. (
The first statement that I've found that Industrial Civilization is likely to collapse into a primitive mode came from the mathematical biologist Alfred Lotka.
The human species, considered in broad perspective, as a unit including its economic and industrial accessories, has swiftly and radically changed its character during the epoch in which our life has been laid. In this sense we are far removed from equilibrium - a fact that is of the highest practical significance, since it implies that a period of adjustment to equilibrium conditions lies before us, and he would be an extreme optimist who should expect that such adjustment can be reached without labor and travail. While such sudden decline might, from a detached standpoint, appear as in accord with the eternal equities, since previous gains would in cold terms balance the losses, yet it would be felt as a superlative catastrophe. Our descendants, if such as this should be their fate, will see poor compensation for their ills and in fact that we did live in abundance and luxury. (Lotka, 1925)
Polymath Norbert Wiener (1894-1964) wrote in 1950 that the best we can hope for the role of progress is that "our attempts to progress in the face of overwhelming necessity may have the purging terror of Greek tragedy."
[
Sir Charles Galton Darwin wrote in 1953:
The fifth revolution will come when we have spent the stores of coal and oil that have been accumulating in the earth during hundreds of millions of years. It is to be hoped that before then other sources of energy will have been developed, but without considering the detail [here] it is obvious that there will be a very great difference in ways of life. Whether a convenient substitute for the present fuels is found or not, there can be no doubt that there will have to be a great change in ways of life. This change may justly be called a revolution, but it differs from all the preceding ones in that there is no likelihood of its leading to increases of population, but even perhaps to the reverse. (
Sir Fred Hoyle in 1964 put it bluntly.
It has often been said that, if the human species fails to make a go of it here on the Earth, some other species will take over the running. In the sense of developing intelligence this is not correct. We have or soon will have, exhausted the necessary physical prerequisites so far as this planet is concerned. With coal gone, oil gone, high-grade metallic ores gone, no species however competent can make the long climb from primitive conditions to high-level technology. This is a one-shot affair. If we fail, this planetary system fails so far as intelligence is concerned. The same will be true of other planetary systems. On each of them there will be one chance, and one chance only. (Hoyle, 1964)
4. World Models, etc.
Perhaps the most widespread evil is the Western view of man and nature. Among us, it is widely believed that man is apart from nature, superior to it; indeed, evolution is a process to create man and seat him on the apex of the cosmic pinnacle. He views the earth as a treasury that he can plunder at will. And, indeed, the behavior of Western people, notably since the advent of the Industrial Revolution, gives incontrovertible evidence to support this assertion.
Ian McHarg, 1971
Jay Forrester of MIT in 1970 built a world model "to understand the options available to mankind as societies enter the transition from growth to equilibrium."
What happens when growth approaches fixed limits and is forced to give way to some form of equilibrium? Are there choices before us that lead to alternative world futures? Exponential growth does not continue forever. Growth of population and industrialization will stop. If man does not take conscious action to limit population and capital investment, the forces inherent in the natural and social system will rise high enough to limit growth. The question is only a matter of when and how growth will cease, not whether it will cease. (Forrester, 1971)
The basic behavior of Forrester's world model was overshoot and collapse. It projected that the material standard of living (MSL) would peak in 1990 and then decline through the year 2100. Moreover, measured by the MSL (i.e. the leading and lagging 30% points), the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization was about 210 years. (Forrester, 1971, Figure 4-2). He used the world model to search for social (i.e. cultural, "conscious action") policies for making the transition to sustainability.
In our social systems, there are no utopias. No sustainable modes of behavior are free of pressures and stresses. But to develop the more promising modes will require restraint and dedication to a long-range future that man may not be capable of sustaining. Our greatest challenge now is how to handle the transition from growth into equilibrium. The industrial societies have behind them long traditions that have encouraged and rewarded growth. The folklore and the success stories praise growth and expansion. But that is not the path of the future. (ibid., 1971)
He found that sustainability could be achieved in the modeled world system when the following five social policies were applied together in 1970:
Natural-resource-usage-rate reduced 75%
Pollution generation reduced 50%
Capital-investment generation reduced 40%
Food production reduced 20%
Birth rate reduced 30% (ibid., 1971)
Critics (mostly economists) argued that such policies were e.g. "blue sky" and "unrealistic". Fortunately, the project team was just then completing a two-year study using the more comprehensive 'World3' model. They too searched for social policies that might achieve sustainability in the world system. However, the World3 'reference run' (like Forrester's in 1971) also projected overshoot and collapse of the world system.
This is the World3 reference run, . Both population POP and industrial output per capita IOPC grow beyond sustainable levels and subsequently decline. The cause of their decline is traceable to the depletion of nonrenewable resources. (Meadows, et al, 1972, Figure 35)
The World3 'reference run' (1972, above) projected that the industrial output per capita (IOPC) would reach its all-time peak in 2013 and then would steeply decline through 2100. Moreover, the duration of Industrial Civilization (as measured by the leading and lagging IOPC 30% points) came out to be about 105 years.
I first presented the Olduvai theory to the public in 1989.
The broad sweep of human history can be divided into three phases.
The first, or pre-industrial phase was a very long period of equilibrium when simple tools and weak machines limited economic growth.
The second, or industrial phase was a very short period of non-equilibrium that ignited with explosive force when powerful new machines temporarily lifted all limits to growth.
The third, or de-industrial phase lies immediately ahead during which time the industrial economies will decline toward a new period of equilibrium, limited by the exhaustion of nonrenewable resources and continuing deterioration of the natural environment. (
In 1992, twenty years after the first World3 study, the team members re-calibrated the model with the latest data and used it to help "envision a sustainable future." But -
All that World3 has told us so far is that the model system, and by implication the "real world" system, has a strong tendency to overshoot and collapse. In fact, in the thousands of model runs we have tried over the years, overshoot and collapse has been by far the most frequent outcome. (Meadows, et al., 1992)
The updated World3 'reference run', in fact, gave almost exactly the same results as it did in the first study in 1972! For example: Industrial output per capita (IOPC) reached its all-time peak in 2014 (v. 2013 previously) and the duration of Industrial Civilization came out to be 102 years (v. 104 years previously).
Australian writer Reg Morrison likewise foresees that overshoot and collapse is where humanity is headed. In his scenario (i.e. no formal model), the world population rises to about 7.0 billion in the 2036. Thence it plunges to 3.2 billion in 2090 - an average loss of 71.4 million people per year (i.e. deaths minus births) during 54 years.
Given the current shape of the human population graph, those indicators also spell out a much larger and, from our point of view, more ominous message: the human plague cycle is right on track for a demographically normal climax and collapse. Not only have our genes managed to conceal from us that we are entirely typical mammals and therefore vulnerable to all of evolution's customary checks and balances, but also they have contrived to lock us so securely into the plague cycle that they seem almost to have been crafted for that purpose. Gaia is running like a Swiss watch. (Morrison, 1999)
The foregoing discussions show that many respected professionals have reached conclusions that are consistent with the Olduvai theory, to which we now turn.
5. The Olduvai Theory: 1930-2030
The earth's immune system, so to speak, has recognized the presence of the human species and is starting to kick in. The earth is attempting to rid itself of an infection by the human parasite.
Richard Preston, 1994
The Olduvai theory, to review, states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to one hundred years, as measured by the world average energy production person per year: ê = E/(Pop). Industrial Civilization, defined herein, began in 1930 and is predicted to end on or before the year 2030. Our main goals for this section are threefold: (1) to discuss the Olduvai theory from 1930 to 2030, (2) to identify the important energy events during this time, and (3) to stress that Industrial Civilization = Electrical Civilization = the 'modern way of life.' Figure 4 depicts the Olduvai theory.
Figure 4. The Olduvai Theory: 1930-2030
Notes: (1) 1930 => Industrial Civilization began when (ê) reached 30% of its peak value. (2) 1979 => ê reached its peak value of 11.15 boe/c. (3) 1999 => The end of cheap oil. (4) 2000 => Start of the "
Figure 4 shows the complete Olduvai curve from 1930 to 2030. Historic data appears from 1930 to 1999 and hypothetical values from 2000 to 2030. These 100 years are labeled "Industrial Civilization." The curve and the events together constitute the "Olduvai schema." Observe that the overall curve has a pulse-like waveform - namely overshoot and collapse. Eight key energy events define the Olduvai schema.
Eight Events: The 1st event in 1930 (see Note 1, Figure 4) marks the beginning of Industrial Civilization when ê reached 3.32 boe/c. This is the "leading 30% point", a standard way to define the duration of a pulse. The 2nd event in 1979 (Note 2) marks the all-time peak of world energy production per capita when ê reached 11.15 boe/c. The 3rd event in 1999 (Note 3) marks the end of cheap oil. The 4th event on
Next in Figure 4 we come the future intervals in the Olduvai schema. The Olduvai "slide", the first of the future intervals, begins in 2000 with the escalating warfare in the
The "cliff" is the final interval in the Olduvai schema. It begins with the 7th event in 2012 (Note 7) when an epidemic of permanent blackouts spreads worldwide, i.e. first there are waves of brownouts and temporary blackouts, then finally the electric power networks themselves expire. The 8th event in 2030 (Note 8) marks the fall of world energy production (use) per capita to the 1930 level (Figure 4). This is the lagging 30% point when Industrial Civilization has become history. The average rate of decline of ê is 5.44%/year from 2012 to 2030.
"The hand writes, then moves on." Decreasing electric reliability is now.
The power shortages in
The electricity business has also run out of almost all-existing generating capacity, whether this capacity is a coal-fired plant, a nuclear plant or a dam. The electricity business has already responded to this shortage. Orders for a massive number of natural gas-fired plants have already been placed. But these new gas plants require an unbelievable amount of natural gas. This immediate need for so much incremental supply is simply not there. (Simmons, 2000)
As we have emphasized, Industrial Civilization is beholden to electricity. Namely: In 1999, electricity supplied 42% (and counting) of the world's end-use energy versus 39% for oil (the leading fossil fuel). Yet the small difference of 3% obscures the real magnitude of the problem because it omits the quality of the different forms of end-use energy. With apologies to George Orwell and the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics - "All joules (J) of energy are equal. But some joules are more equal than others." Thus, if you just want to heat your coffee, then 1 J of oil energy works just as well as 1 J of electrical energy. However, if you want to power up your computer, then 1 J of electricity is worth 3 J of oil. Therefore, the ratio of the importance of electricity versus oil to Industrial Civilization is not 42:39, but more like 99:1. Similar ratios apply to electricity versus gas and electricity versus coal.
Au Courant King Kilowatt!
Question: Where will the Olduvai die-off occur? Response: Everywhere. But large cities, of course, will be the most dangerous places to reside when the electric grids die. There you have millions of people densely packed in high-rise buildings, surrounded by acres-and-acres of blacktop and concrete: no electricity, no work, and no food. Thus the urban areas will rapidly depopulate when the electric grids die. In fact we have already mapped out the danger zones. (e.g. See Living Earth, 1996.) Specifically: The big cities stand out brightly as yellow-orange dots on NASA's satellite mosaics (i.e. pictures) of the earth at night. These planetary lights blare out "Beware", "Warning", and "Danger". The likes of
6. Summary and Conclusions
The theory of civilization is traced from Greek philosophy in about 500 BCE to a host of respected scientists in the 20th century. For example: The 'reference runs' of two world simulation models in the 1970s put the life expectancy of civilization between about 100 and 200 years. The Olduvai theory is specifically defined as the ratio of world energy production and world population. It states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to 100 years: from 1930 to 2030. The theory is tested against historic data from 1920 to 1999.
Although all primary sources of energy are important, the Olduvai theory postulates that electricity is the quintessence of Industrial Civilization. World energy production per capita increased strongly from 1945 to its all-time peak in 1979. Then from 1979 to 1999 - for the first time in history - it decreased from 1979 to 1999 at a rate of 0.33%/year (the Olduvai 'slope', Figure 4). Next from 2000 to 2011, according to the Olduvai schema, world energy production per capita will decrease by about 0.70%/year (the 'slide'). Then around year 2012 there will be a rash of permanent electrical blackouts - worldwide. These blackouts, along with other factors, will cause energy production per capita by 2030 to fall to 3.32 b/year, the same value it had in 1930. The rate of decline from 2012 to 2030 is 5.44%/year (the Olduvai 'cliff'). Thus, by definition, the duration of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to 100 years.
The Olduvai 'slide' from 2001 to 2011 (Figure 4) may resemble the "Great Depression" of 1929 to 1939: unemployment, breadlines, and homelessness. As for the Olduvai 'cliff' from 2012 to 2030 - I know of no precedent in human history.
Governments have lost respect. World organizations are ineffective. Neo-tribalism is rampant. The population is over six billion and counting. Global warming and emerging viruses are headlines. The reliability of electric power networks is falling. And the instant the power goes out, you are back in the Dark Age.
In 1979 I concluded, "If God made the earth for human habitation, then He made it for the Stone Age mode of habitation." The Olduvai theory is thinkable.
References
BPAmoco (2000). BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy (1968-2000). BP Amoco,
Duncan, RC (2000a). The Heuristic Oil Forecasting Method: User's Guide & Forecast #4. www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/ (Forecast #4). 30 p.
Eiseley, L (1970). The Invisible Pyramid.
Forrester, J (1971, 1973). World Dynamics. Wright-Allen Press,
Gibbons, JH, Blair, PD and Gwin, HL (1989). Strategies for Energy Use. Scientific American, 261 (3), September, p. 86-93.
Hoyle, F (1964). Of Men and Galaxies.
Living Earth (1996). The Brilliant Earth: A Nocturnal Satellite Map. The Living Earth, Inc.,
Lotka, AJ (1925). Elements of Physical Biology. Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore. 460 p.
McHarg, I (1971). Man, Planetary Disease. Vital Speeches of the Day (October). p. 634-640.
Meadows, DH, Meadows, DL,
Meadows, DH, Meadows, DL,
Morrison, R (1999). The Spirit in the Gene: Humanity's Proud Illusion and the Laws of Nature.
Romer, RH (1985). Energy: Facts and Figures. Spring Street Press,
Spemann, H (1938). Embryonic Development and Induction.
Simmons, MR (2000). Energy in the New Economy: The Limits to Growth. Energy Institute of the
Tainter, JA (1988). The Collapse of Complex Societies.
Weatherford, JM (1994). Savages and Civilization: Who Will Survive? Crown,
White, L (1949). The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization. Farrar, Straus & Co.
Wiener, N (1950, 1954). The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society.
Institute on Energy and Man
duncanrc@halcyon.com
An in-depth analysis has been published in The Social Contract, Winter 2005-2006: The Olduvai Theory. Energy, Population, and Industrial Civilization.
"The Olduvai Theory states that the life expectancy of industrial civilization is approximately 100 years: circa 1930-2030. Energy production per capita (e) defines it. The exponential growth of world energy production ended in 1970... Average e will show no growth from 1979 through circa 2008 ... The rate of change of e will go steeply negative circa 2008 ... World population will decline to about two billion circa 2050 ... A growing number of independent studies concur...."